Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, John Cottingham and Ian McFetridge

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
4304 Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
4303 The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
4316 Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4306 For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]